April, 1937

LEGISLATION
The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936
That phase of the New Deal which, by regulating the exchanges on which
agricultural commodities are sold, seeks to assure the farmer a fair return for
his product and the consumer a dependable food supply at low cost is one recent
reform which may not be described as being wholly without precedent in our
history. The Commodity Exchange Act 1 is merely a series of amendments to
the Grain Futures Act 2 which, despite several Supreme Court tests, has been
in effect since 1922. In this respect, the Commodity Exchange Act bears little
resemblance to what is sometimes thought of as a companion piece of legislation,
the Securities Exchange Actt;3 for the latter in seeking to control stock and
curb markets enters upon a field distinctly new to federal regulation. Nevertheless, the constitutionality of the Commodity Exchange Act has been challenged, 4 and therefore it is the purpose of this note to examine the extent to
which these amendments introduce unconstitutional features into federal regulation of agricultural markets and to consider whether such recent decisions as

the Schechter case,' the Panama Refiing Co. case,' and the Bituminous Coal

case I affect the validity of the regulations already upheld. The amendments
will be treated here as constituting four classes: (i) those which prohibit certain conduct on the part of traders using the exchange facilities; (2) those which
regulate brokers' dealings with their principals; (3) those which regulate the
conduct of the exchanges themselves; and finally (4) those which strengthen
the enforcement provisions of the earlier act.
I
Section 4 (a) of the Act ' contains probably its most important and most
controversial provision. After reciting that excessive speculation in commodity
futures,' by causing sudden and unreasonable price changes, unduly burdens
interstate commerce in those commodities, the Act authorizes the Commodity
Exchange Commission 10 to fix limits on the amount of trading by any person
and prohibits trading in excess thereof. The theory underlying the provision is
that a few large-scale speculators, if the size of their holdings is not limited, will
be able to control price movements," but the Act was not designed to eliminate
1. 49 STAT. 1491 (1936), 7 U. S. C. A.

A.

§ i (Supp. 1936).

§ I (1926). See Note (1934) 2 GEO. WAsH.
REv. 457.
3. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77a (Supp. 1936).
2. 42 STAT. 998 (1922), 7 U. S. C.

L.

4. Board of Trade v. Milligan, 16 F. Supp. 859 (W. D. Mo. 1936) ; Bennett v. Board
of Trade, unreported,Fed. Dist. Ct. N. D. Ill., Sept. 1936; Moore v. Chicago Merc. Exchange,
unreported, Fed. Dist. Ct. N. D. Ill., Aug. 1936. The Act was held constitutional in all three
cases. Certiorari was denied by the U. S. Supreme Court when it was sought to avoid an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals. (1936) 4 U. S. L. WEEK I.
5. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
6. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935).

7. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
8. 49 STAT. 1492, 7 U. S. C. A. § 6a (Supp. 1936).
9. Futures are contracts of sale for future delivery. 42 STAT. 999 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A.
§5 (1926).
10. The commission consists of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce
and the Attorney General. 49 STAT. 1492, 7 U. S. C. A. § 2 (Supp. 1936).
Ii. This is especially true at certain seasons of the year, as in September when the crop
is moving to market; large scale short selling by a few speculators will have an unduly depressing effect at a time when the market needs support most. Hearings before Committee
on Agriculture and Forestry on H. R. 677z, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 211, 212.
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speculation entirely.1 2 Under the existing economic organization, speculation
performs an indispensable function in providing a continuously liquid market
and in reducing the risks involved in marketing and distributing commodities. 3
Hence the Act is directed against only excesswe speculation, causing price
changes wholly unjustified by changes in the supply and demand factors. Moreover, hedging' 4 does not constitute speculation under the Act, so that in computing trading limits hedging transactions are not to be considered.
The constitutional problem raised by the section is two-fold: (a) May the
federal government, without usurping powers reserved to the states, prohibit
excessive speculation in commodity futures? (b) If so, has the power been
properly exercised, considering that the amount of speculation permitted is not
stipulated in the Act but is to be fixed by a commission? The first question,
despite the vagueness of the concept which is the constitutional basis of this
provision-interstate commerce-seems clearly to require an affirmative answer.
It is settled that commodity futures contracts are local transactions, since delivery, if contemplated at all,' 5 is not required to be made by interstate shipment.16 Like other intrastate transactions, however, they may directly affect
interstate commerce and so be amenable to federal regulation.17 That grain
futures contracts are intrastate transactions of this sort was held in Board of
Trade v. Olsen,"' which declared the Grain Futures Act constitutional. That
Act, however, merely gave the Secretary oi Agriculture power to revoke the
licenses of grain exchanges as "contract markets" because "manipulation . . .
on the exchanges unduly burdened interstate commerce." 1 Yet, a congressional
finding that manipulation unduly burdens interstate commerce is not essentially
different from one that excessive speculation unduly burdens interstate commerce, given the premise, approved by the Supreme Court, that commodities 20
12. Opponents of the Act have contended it would have that effect. See, for example,
Hearings before Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, supra note ii, at 40, 41, where it
was also urged that margin restrictions would sufficiently control excessive speculation, without trading limits. But at pp. 210, 211, it is pointed out that margin requirements would not
deter large scale operators who generally have large enough resources to meet high margin
requirements.
13. Huebner, The Insurance Senice of Commodity Exchanges (1931) 155 ANNALs I.
14. Hedging transactions are ". . . sales of any commodity for future delivery .
to the extent that such sales are offset in quantity by the ownership or purchase of the same
cash commodity, or, conversely, purchases . . . for future delivery . . . to the extent
that such purchases are offset by sales of the same cash commodity." 49 STAT. 1493, 7 U. S.
C. A. § 6a (3) (Supp. 1936). In computing the amount which any person may hedge, there
is included the amount of the commodity the person intends to raise within the next year
on his own land as well as an amount which would be a reasonable hedge against his ownership or purchase of products of the commodity, or against the sale of such products.
15. Intention to deliver grain under the contract is necessary in some states to prevent it
from being held void as a gambling transaction. Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U. S.

188 (i933).
The Grain Futures Act did not legalize contracts unlawful by state law; it merely set
out additional conditions to the legality of such contracts. See Taylor, Trading in Commodity
Futures, 43 YALs L. J. 63, 95-102; at lO, it is estimated that 95% of the futures contracts
made on the Kansas City Board of Trade violate Missouri law.
i6. Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U. S. 405 (i9o8) ; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S.
44, 69 (1922) ; Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593, 604 (1926).
17. E. g. United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525 (1913) (running a corner in cotton on
the New York Exchange held unlawful obstruction to interstate commerce under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act) ; United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199 (1919) (forgery of bill of
lading for goods shipped in interstate commerce validly made a federal offense).
18. 262 U. S. i (7923).
i9. 42 STAT. 999 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. § 5 (1926).
2o. The Grain Futures Act upheld in the Olsen case dealt only with grain; the present
Act includes wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds,
butter, eggs and Irish potatoes. The same principles seem to be involved.
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moving from the farms through the exchanges to the consumers in all parts of
the nation are in a "stream of interstate commerce." 21 Naturally serious obstructions to the flow of that stream may be caused by individuals whose volume

of trading for speculative purposes goes beyond reasonable bounds, 22 just as

manipulation of prices may have that effect, as by making production unprofitable
or by putting consumption beyond the power of some sections of the population.
It is this strategic position of the exchanges-like valves regulating the flow of
commodities from producers to consumers all over the country-that caused the
Supreme Court to conclude that the Chicago Board of Trade was "engaged in a
business affected2 with a public national interest and is subject to national regulation as such".

The second question relates to the doctrine of the Separation of Powerb
and the prohibition against the delegation of legislative power to another body.
These principles, however, are not rigidly observed, so that a certain amount of
delegation is permissible. The cases allowing delegation are of two classes:
those where the law which the legislature has enacted is to become effective upon
an independent body finding a given fact to exist; 24 and those where the independent body is given the authority to make rules in accordance with sufficiently
definite standards set by the legislature. 25 Here, the case turns upon the nature
of the standards set up in the Act to guide the commission in establishing trading
limits.

The authority granted is "to fix such limits . . . as the commission

finds is necessary to diminish, eliminate or prevent" the burden on interstate
commerce caused by excessive speculation and the consequent "sudden or unreasonable fluctuation" and unwarranted changes in prices. Standards such as
"just and reasonable rates", 2 6 "unfair, unjust and discriminatory practices" 27
have been held sufficiently definite in the Packers and Stockyards Act,2 1 an Act

whose similarity to the Grain Futures Act was used to sustain generally the
latter in Board of Trade v. Olsen. The standard here in question is hardly less
definite. Moreover, it is quite clear that the authority delegated is not capable
of efficient exercise by the Congress itself.

The exchanges in the country vary

greatly in the volume of trading done on them, 29 so that excessive speculation
by an individual on the Duluth Exchange might not be such on the Chicago
Board of Trade, and even within the same market excessive speculation at one
season might not be such at another time. An administrative body alone could
adjust its regulations to meet the changing situations and yet adhere closely to
the controlling policy designed by Congress in the Act.
21. The Olsen case utilized the metaphor applied in Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495,
519 (1922), to the shipment of livestock.

Hearingsbefore Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, supra note iI, at 278.
23. Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. I (1923). The Schechter and Bituminous Coal
22.

cases cite this case with approval, distinguishing the regulation of grain exchanges and of
stockyards [upheld in Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922)] from fixing prices and

wages in the poultry slaughtering business and fixing wages for miners of coal.
24. The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch 382 (U. S. 1813) ; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892);
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
25. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 (1907) ; Interstate Comm. Comm.
v. Illinois C. R. Co., 215 U. S. 452 (191o); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1911).
26. Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 STAT. 164 (1921), 7 U. S. C. A. §2o6 (1926), held
valid in Tagg Bros. & Morehead v. United States, 28o U. S. 42o (1930).
27. Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 STAT. 165 (92), 7 U. S. C. A. § 208 (1926), held
valid in Farmers' Livestock Commission v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 375 (E. D. Ill. 193I).
28. Held generally valid in Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922).
29. Eighty-six per cent of grain futures trading in the United States is transacted on the
Chicago Board of Trade. Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, supra
note II, at 210.
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Section 8a (5) of the Commodity Exchange Act 3C presents a related problem, by giving the Commission authority "to make . . . such rules . . . as,
in the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture, are reasonably necessary to
effectuate any of the provisions or to accomplish any of the purposes of this
and Stockyards
Act." This is almost identical with 3a2 provision of the Packers
33
Act,"1 upheld in Stafford v. Wallace, and the grazing Act, upheld in U. S. v.
Grimaud.3 4 While these standards-those in section 4a and in section 8a (5)
of the Act-are quite broad, they are not without the limits which the precedents
warrant. Panama Reftning Co. v. Ryan does not compel a different conclusion,
for in that case no standard whatsoever was given the President to determine
when he should prohibit shipments in interstate commerce of oil produced in
88
Less easily distinguishable is the Schechter case, which
excess of state quotas.
held invalid the delegation to the President of authority to approve codes of fair
competition. The only standard given was that the President "effectuate the
policy of" the National Recovery Act,B and the policy was set out in another
which in substance
section-a conglomeration of purposes, some conflicting,
37
One important distinction
would convey authority to rehabilitate all industry.
between the delegation invalidated by the Schechter case and that in section 8a
(5) of the Commodity Exchange Act lies in a difference of degree: The Commodity Exchange Act relates only to excessive speculation and certain specified
abuses in commodities trading and does not attempt to cure all the dislocations
of all trade and industry. The standard of section 4a would seem to be definite
enough despite the Schechter case. for the latter case did not present any standard as definite as "excessive speculation" causing "unreasonable fluctuations and
unwarranted changes in price" on the commodities exchanges.
Section 4c of the Commodity Exchange Act 88 prohibits fictitious sales and
seems to be clearly valid under the holding in Board of Trade v. Olsen, for the
term "manipulation" as used in the Grain Futures Act would include those practices more specifically named in the present Act. The position taken by one of
the exchanges in Board of Trade v. Milligan,"9 that fictitious sales do not affect
interstate commerce directly can derive little support from the Schechter case,
where Board of Trade v. Olsen was cited without any suggestion that it was no
longer law. That part of section 4c which prohibits option contracts 40 by which
offers are kept open a day or so presents a more serious question, but the conclusion that such transactions encourage excessive speculation and cause unreasonable market fluctuations would seem well founded. In the Futures Trading Act,41 these contracts were taxed prohibitively, but the tax was held uncon30. 49 STAT. 150, 7 U. S. C. A. § i2a (5) (Supp. 1936).
31. 42 STAT. 169 (192), 7 U. S. C. A. § 228 (1926).
32. 258 U. S. 495 (1922).
33. 30 STAT. 35 (897), 16 U. S. C. A. § 551 (1926).
34. 220 U. S. 5o6 (I911).
35. "The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce
. . . of petroleum, . . . in excess of the amount permitted to be produced . . . by any
. . . state." 48 STAT. 200 (933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 709 (Supp. 1936).
36. 48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §70, (Supp. 1936).
37. 48 STAT. 195 (933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 70, (Supp. 1936), lists the following purposes:

remove obstruction to free flow of commerce; promote the organization of industry; further
united labor action; eliminate unfair competitive practices; promote the fullest utilization of
the productive capacity of industry; increase consumption and purchasing power; reduce unemployment; improve labor standards; rehabilitate industry; conserve natural resources.
38. 49 STAT. 1494, 7 U. S. C. A. § 6c (Supp. 1936).
39. 16 F. Supp. 859 (W. D. Mo. z936), Bill of Complaint 32, 33.
40. Also called privileges and indemnities, puts and calls, bids and offers.
41. 42 STAT. I87 (1921).
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stitutional in Trusler v. Crooks41 for the same reason that the Futures Trading
Act generally was held unconstitutional three years earlier in Hill v. Wallace,"
i. e., on the ground of the lack of a congressional finding that such transactions
on the exchanges affect interstate commerce directly. The Grain Futures Act
omitted to deal with them because it was passed before Trusler v. Crooks, and
at a time when it was thought Hill v. Wallace had not invalidated this provision
of the Futures Trading Act. The present Act in outlawing these transactions
adopts the suggestions of many exchange officers and the rules already in force
on the exchanges. 44

ii
In attempting to deal with the relations of floor brokers, commission merchants and the public, the Act departs in important respects from the Grain
Futures Act. Section 4b 45 prohibits exchange members from defrauding their
customers and from representing both buyer and seller in the same transaction
without their principals'--the customers'-consent. Section 4d 46 requires that
commission merchants treat as trust funds sums which they hold for their principals, with the exception that customers' accounts may be commingled and may
also be invested in specified securities. It is clear that these provisions aim
only to impose the duties of a fiduciary upon a class of men who, under accepted
legal theory as well as by every consideration of policy, ought to bear such obligations. The provisions would seem to establish a limitation reasonably incident
to the regulation of interstate conmerce,4 7 although they have been attacked as
having no relation to the objective of stabilizing commodity markets, which has
been the justification for the regulations already considered. That the states
might punish such frauds as are here prohibited, of course, does not constitute
this regulation an invasion of state power.
III
Those sections of the act which deal with the conduct of the exchanges
themselves adopt the technique of the Grain Futures Act, all of whose provisions
were made operative by the device of licensing the exchanges on condition that
their rules prohibit certain things and require others. Thus, under section 5a
(-) of the present Act 4 the exchange must require that all futures contracts
permit performance to be made by delivery of warehouse receipts issued under

the United States Warehouse Act,4 9 even though the warehouse is not also

licensed by state law. It has been contended that, where the state law requires 50
state licensing of all grain elevators, this provision which forbids discrimination
against federally licensed elevators would be invalid."' The argument is that the
federal Act was not intended to occupy the whole field of elevator regulation to
the exclusion of the states, because the federal Act expressly provides that it is
42. 269 U. S. 475 (1926).
43. 259 U. S. 44 (1922).
44. Hearings before Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, supra note ii, at 220-225.
But see p. 137, where exchange officials petition the end of the prohibition against indemni-

ties.

45. 49 STAT. 1493, 7 U. S. C. A. § 6b (Supp. 1936).
46. 49 STAT. 1494, 7 U. S. C. A. § 6d (Supp. 1936).
47. See United States v. Donahue Bros., 59 F. (2d) io19 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932), where
the provision of the Packers and Stockyards Act which imposed the duties of a fiduciary on
commission merchants was upheld.
48. 49 STAT. 1498, 7 U. S. C. A. § 7a (7) (Supp. 1936).
49. 39 STAT. 486 (1916), 7 U. S. C. A. §241 (1926).
50. ILL. CoNST. art. XIII.
52. Hearings before Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, supra note I1, at IOO-IO5.
The contention is answered at pp. 228, 229, 263-271.
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52
While this point
not to conflict with or impair the operation of state laws.
must be conceded, it by no means follows that Congress may not subsequently
occupy the whole field and make its own regulation controlling in this particular
phase of interstate commerce. The dispute is as to whether Congress has done
so by this provision in section 5a (7), but since the conflict between state law
and the section in question is so apparent and there is nothing in the section
which shows an intent to avoid that conflict-as there was in the original Warehouse Act-it would follow that Congress intended that the federal law be controlling.
Section 5a (4) 'I requires the exchanges to cease trading, from three to
ten days before the end of the month, in contracts calling for the delivery of a
commodity during the current month when the Secretary of Agriculture finds
such provision will tend to prevent market congestion endangering price stability.
This section was designed to prevent comers by giving sellers an opportunity
to buy cash grain and satisfy their contracts during the three to ten day period
when there will be no demand from new contracts for delivery in that monthsince trading in them will have ceased.5 4 The provision would seem to be valid
as against the contention that it did not directly affect interstate commerce or
was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the Secretary of
Agriculture, under reasoning similar to that which should validate the excessive
speculation limitation of section 4a.
Section 5a (5) 55 provides that the seller must give the buyer at least one
day's notice of delivery under a futures contract, and that the Secretary of
Agriculture may fix a longer period (up to 1o days) for such notice where he
finds that it will diminish "unfair practices". While this standard might seem
the vaguest in the Act on the point of delegation of legislative power and of
doubtful validity in view of the Schechter decision, yet it presents a problem
distinct from that in the case of power delegated to devise "such rules as will
diminish unfair practices." Congress here has specified what the law shall be "I
and leaves it to the Secretary to decide when it shall be called into force, namely,
when he finds "unfair practices" will be diminished thereby. A situation midway between these two cases is that where the provisions of the Packers and
Stockyards Act are to come into effect upon the finding of the Secretary of
Agriculture that "unfair practices" exist. It has been held in that case that
"unfair practices" is sufficiently definite for a finding of fact upon which a law is
to become effective whether or not it5is
7 definite enough to be a guide in the making
of rules by an administrative officer.
The hostility of exchanges towards cooperatives, which made necessary an
express stipulation in the Grain Futures Act that no exchange will be licensed
unless it does not discriminate against cooperative associations, has been responsible for some new provisions relative to cooperatives in the Commodity Exchange Act.58 Section 6a (1) 59 prohibits the suspension from membership by

52. Congress, by the United States Warehouse Act, has not made federal regulation of
warehouses exclusive; hence, state regulation is valid. Independent Gin & Warehouse Co. v.
Dunwoody, 4o F. (2d) I (C. C. A. 5th, 1930). See 42-STAT. 1285 (1923), 7 U. S. C. A. §269
(1926).

125.

53. 49 STAT. 1497, 7 U. S. C. A. § 7a (4) (Supp. 1936).
54. Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, supra note ii, at 124,

55. 49 STAT. 1497, 7 U. S. C. A. § 7a (5) (Supp. 1936).
56. Viz., that trading shall be suspended from three to ten days.
57. Handy Bros. Co. v. Wallace, 16 F. Supp. 662 (E. D. Pa. 1936).
58. That the possibility of discrimination is not altogether remote may be seen from the
fact that the protection of the Grain Futures Act was successfully sought in Board of Trade
v. Wallace, 67 F. (2d) 4o2 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933), cert. denied, 291 U. S. 68o (1934).
59. 49 STAT. 1499, 7 U. S. C. A. § loa (i) (Supp. 1936).
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the exchange of financially responsible cooperatives, except following a hearing
before the commission upon a complaint after three days' notice. A commission
order to continue or suspend the cooperative's membership is reviewable by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, but its order is not to stay pending the review.60 Thus
unlike other exchange members, cooperatives may not be expelled unless and
until the Commission so orders or its order to the contrary has been set aside by
the courts.6 '
The policy of fostering cooperatives and protecting them from the hostility
of other traders on the exchanges which seems to justify the different procedure
for expulsion provided for them resulted also in the Grain Futures Act in too
favorable a treatment of them in the matter of rebates. Thus while other exchange members were forbidden by exchange rules to record a sale at one price
and then pay to the seller an additional price as a discount from the broker's
commission,6 2 cooperatives were permitted to return to their members dividends
which were based upon the quantity of grain delivered to the cooperative by the
members. The only qualification upon this so-called "patronage dividend right"
was that it be paid out of earnings, and this restriction became of little importance because of the set-up of the grain cooperatives. A national cooperative
paid its regional member associations certain sums for advertising or "educational" purposes, from which the individual producers were paid patronage
dividends based on the quantity sold by the producer through the cooperative.
These dividends were paid out of the regional cooperative's surplus, but in many
cases the money which they thus distributed came from the national cooperative
which had no surplus. The present Act requires that such dividends coming
ultimately from the national cooperative be paid out of its surplus.63
IV
Probably the most serious weakness in the former Grain Futures Act was
its unwieldy and cumbersome enforcement provisions. The Act provided for
revocation of the exchange's license to operate as a "contract market"; 64 it
required exclusion from exchange trading privileges of individuals who are
violating the act; 65 it punished as a misdemeanor trading except through licensed
exchanges; 66 and made unlawful the use of the mails or other means of communication in interstate commerce to circulate false crop or market infornmation.67 The disruption to trade and the possible economic loss to many thousandg
of innocent people which might be caused by the revocation of the designation
of the Chicago Board of Trade, for example, as a contract market, quite understandably might cause an official to hesitate long before invoking the aid of such
a provision. While exclusion of individuals from trading privileges may seem
to go to the other extreme in providing a punishment too mild to deter those
bent on "making a killing" by market manipulations, an even more serious
weakness was revealed in this provision by the case of Cutten v. Wallace.68 In
that case the present tense, "is violating", as used in the Act, was held to pre6o. The order is not penal and so a stay could be prohibited by the Act.
61. An exception to this provision is recognized where the cooperative is suspended because of inability to meet its obligations.
62. Hearings before Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, supra note II, at 95, 97.
63. The separate entity of national and regional cooperatives is, in effect, disregarded by
the Act.
64. 42 STAT. I00I (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. § 8 (1926).
65. 42 STAT. 1002 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. §9 (1926).
66. 42 STAT. 999, 1003 (1922), U. S. C. A. §§ 6, 13 (1926).
67. 42 STAT.IOO3 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1926).
68. 298 U. S. 229 (1936).
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vent the exclusion of a trader for past violations. The limited scope of the penal
provisions of the old Act (against trading through unlicensed exchanges and
against spreading false crop or market information) prevents them from being
an important factor in the regulation of the exchanges.
On the other hand, the amendments contained in the Commodity Exchange
Act strengthen materially the enforcement provisions of the Grain Futures Act.
Under section 6b '1 of the new Act, in the event that the exchange violates any
of the Act's provisions, a cease and desist order may issue against the officers or
agents of the exchange in addition to the possibility of revocation of the exchange's license. A violation of the order entails heavy criminal punishment,
with each day's violation constituting a new offense. The new Act remedies the
defect revealed by the Cutten case, so that past violations as well as present
violations may lead to an exclusion from trading privileges. A closer control over
the member's trading activities is afforded by requiring registration of commission merchants and floor brokers with the Secretary of Agriculture who has
to inspect the books
power to suspend.7 0 Finally, the Secretary is authorized
12
and records of the exchanges 71 of the members, and of the warehouses 73 in
which are stored commodities deliverable on futures contracts.
While the constitutionality of the enforcement provisions of the old Act was
not ruled upon in Board of Trade v. Olsen, a lower federal court has upheld
them since that decision 7 4 and there would not seem to be much doubt of their
validity in view of the validity of the general provisions of the former Act and
the fact that a judicial review is granted under the penal sections of that Act.
The additional sanctions of the Commodity Exchange Act have ample precedent
-the registration and inspection provisions are almost identical with those in
the Packers and Stockyards Act.7 5 Criminal penalties for the 7 6violation of
administrative regulations were upheld in United States v. Grimaud.
Conclusion
The Commodity Exchange Act, irrespective of opinions of other New Deal
legislation, presents no startling innovations either in policy or in manner of
operation. It does buttress in important respects the existing federal grain exchange regulations, extending them to the other commodity markets. Its enforcement provisions are much more workable than those under the former law.
Its chief weakness on the ground of constitutionality springs from doubt as to
the meaning of the Schechter and the Bituminous Coal cases; only if those cases
constitute a departure from the pre-existing law as to interstate commerce and
the delegation of legislative authority can the general validity of the Commodity Exchange Act be challenged. It is unlikely that those cases have such
a meaning since Board of Trade v. Olsen is cited in both cases without even a
suggestion that it is being overruled; and, as has been held in the lower federal
courts, 77 the principles held valid in the Olsen case are decisive of the present

Act's validity.

N.L.P.

69. 49 STAT. 1500, 7 U. S. C. A. § 13a (Supp. 1936).
70. 49 STAT. 1494, 1500, 7 U. S. C. A. §§6d (i), 12a (Supp. 1936).
71. 49 STAT. 1497, 7 U. S. C. A. § 7a (2) (Supp. 1936).
72. 49 STAT. 1496, 7 U. S. C. A. § 6g (Supp. 1936).
73. 49 STAT. 1497, 7 U. S. C. A. § 7a (3) (Supp. 1936).
74. Board of Trade v. Wallace, 67 F. (2d) 402, 407 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933), cert. denied,
291

U.

S. 68o

(1934).

75. The inspection provisions of the Grain Futures Act were held valid in Bartlett Frazier
Co. v. Hyde, 65 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 654 (1933).
76. 220 U. S. 506 (ig1).
77. See supra note 4.

